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CASE NOTE
SECURITIES LAW — How Strong is Strong Enough?: The Tellabs Court
Lacked the Needed Strength for Pleading Scienter in Securities Fraud; Tellabs,
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).
James B. Fipp*

INTRODUCTION
Tellabs, Inc. (Tellabs), a publicly traded company, manufactures, and
markets specialized optical networks, broadband access, and voice-quality
enhancement equipment to telecommunications carriers and internet service
providers globally.1 Tellabs became another company of public notoriety when
respondents (Shareholders), a group of Tellabs’ stockholders, accused Tellabs
and its chief executive ofﬁcer (CEO), Richard Notebaert (Notebaert), of making
false statements in an attempt to deceive investors about the actual value of
Tellabs stock.2
Shareholders claimed Notebaert misled investors in multiple press releases
by stating demand for Tellabs’ “core optical products . . . remain[ed] strong,”
and Tellabs was on track to meet its revenue projections.3 From December 11,
2000 until June 19, 2001, Shareholders alleged Notebaert consciously deluded
the public in four ways.4 First, Notebaert made statements indicating demand
for Tellabs’ core product, the TITAN 5500 (“5500”), continued to grow when
demand actually fell.5 Second, he made false statements that Tellabs’ new product,
the TITAN 6500 (“6500”), was available and in strong demand, when it was
* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2009. I would like to thank the entire Wyoming
Law Review Board and Professor Gelb for their invaluable assistance with the editing and revising
of this case note. I would also like to express my immeasurable love and gratitude to my parents
for their unconditional love, support, guidance, and all the opportunities they have provided me.
Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank JC for everything He has provided me in my
life. I owe everything to Him.
1

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. (Tellabs II), 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2505 (2007);
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., v. Tellabs, Inc. (Tellabs I), 437 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2006); Brief for
Petitioners at 3, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (No. 06-484),
2007 WL 432763; Brief for Respondents at 1, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S.
Ct. 2499 (2007) (No. 06-484), 2007 WL 760412.
2
Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2505; Tellabs I, 437 F.3d at 591. Shareholders accused several other
executives including Tellabs’ chairman and former CEO, Richard Birck (Birck). Tellabs II, 127 S.
Ct. at 2505; Tellabs I, 437 F.3d at 591.
3

Tellabs I, 437 F.3d at 592.

4

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2505.

5

Tellabs I, 437 F.3d at 593. Tellabs core business founded itself on the TITAN 5500, Tellabs’
ﬂagship networking device. Id. at 596. “[I]n Tellabs 2000 Annual Report, published in February,
2001, Notebaert and Birck responded to a frequently asked question (‘[A]re you worried that [the
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not yet ready for delivery.6 Third, Notebaert misrepresented Tellabs’ ﬁnancial
outlook for the fourth-quarter of 2000 by fraudulently inﬂating the sales results.7
Finally, he made multiple overstated earnings and revenue projections.8 These
misrepresentations, contended the Shareholders, resulted in the recommended
buying of Tellabs’ stock by market analysts.9
Evidence of the business struggling did not surface publicly until March 2001,
when Tellabs reduced its ﬁrst-quarter sales projections.10 Downward projections
continued on April 6, 2001, when Tellabs reduced its ﬁrst-quarter projections
for a second time.11 On June 19, 2001, Notebaert informed investors that sales
for the 5500 had dropped dramatically.12 Once again, Tellabs reduced its sales
projections, this time for the second-quarter as a result of the decreased demand
for the 5500.13 The following day, “the price of Tellabs stock, which had reached
a high of $67 during the [class] period, plunged to a low of $15.87.”14

TITAN 5500] has peaked?’) by stating ﬂatly, “No . . . . Although we introduced the product nearly
10 years ago, it’s still going strong.” Id. at 597. In addition, on March 8, 2001, a Deutsche Bank
analyst asked Notebaert whether Tellabs was experiencing any reduction in TITAN 5500 sales. Id.
“Notebaert responded: [W]e’re still seeing that product continue to maintain its growth rate; it’s still
experiencing strong acceptance.” Id.
6
Id. The TITAN 6500 is Tellabs’ next-generation networking device, designed to replace
the TITAN 5500. Id. On December 11, 2000, Notebaert stated : “[T]he TITAN 6500 system is
available now.” Id. at 598. Additionally, “[o]n March 8, 2001, Notebaert told analysts, ‘Interest in
and demand for the 6500 continues to grow . . . . We continue to ship the . . . 6500 through the ﬁrst
quarter. We are satisfying very strong demand and growing customer demand.’” Id.
7

Tellabs I, 437 F.3d at 593. Shareholders alleged Tellabs inﬂated its fourth-quarter results
by channel stufﬁng, a process where the company produces false purchase orders and then sends
customers products they never ordered. Id. at 598. “This practice . . . creates a short-term illusion of
increased demand between the time when the company sends the extra product down the line and
the time when the distributors return the unwanted excess.” Id.
8
Id. Tellabs reduced its ﬁrst-quarter sales projections of $830 to $865 million to $772 million.
Id. at 592-93. Tellabs also reduced its second-quarter revenue projection to $500 million from a
previous projection of a range between $780 to $820 million. Id. at 593.
9

Id. at 592; see also Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2505.

10

Tellabs I, 437 F.3d at 592. Tellabs reduced its ﬁrst-quarter sales projections from a range of
$865 to $890 million to a range of $830 to $865 million. Id. Notebaert, however, attributed this
reduction to poor growth in another division of the business and still made positive comments
regarding demand for its networking products, speciﬁcally the TITAN 6500, and his belief that
Tellabs would meet the adjusted projections. Id.
11

Id. at 593. Tellabs reduced its ﬁrst-quarter sales projections of $830 to $865 million to $772
million a month later. Id. Again, Notebaert reassured investors that demand for the 6500 was still
strong, but customers pushing orders from the ﬁrst-quarter to the second-quarter of 2001 resulted
in a decreased projection of Tellabs’ results. Id.
12

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2505.

13

Tellabs I, 437 F.3d at 593. Tellabs reduced its second-quarter sales projections to $500 million
from a previous projection of a range between $780 and $820 million. Id.
14

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2505. The class period is from December 11, 2000 until June 19,
2001. Id.
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On December 3, 2002, the Shareholders ﬁled their ﬁrst complaint against
Tellabs in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.15
The complaint stated Tellabs and Notebaert committed securities fraud, violating
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC rule 10b-5.16 The district
court granted Tellabs’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, without
prejudice.17 The district court found the Shareholders failed to plead their case
with particularity as required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PSLRA).18 Additionally, the court found the Shareholders failed to meet
the scienter requirement for a securities fraud pleading, “which requires that
. . . [the defendant] likely intended ‘to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.’”19 On
July 2, 2003, the Shareholders ﬁled a second amended complaint; the district
court dismissed the complaint with prejudice upon Tellabs’ motion.20 The district
court found the Shareholders met the particularity pleading standard with
respect to Notebaert’s misleading statements.21 These particular facts, however,
failed to establish a “strong inference” of scienter, a requirement in a securities
fraud pleading.22
The Shareholders appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit claiming the district court erred in its judgment because “(1) some
of the statements the court dismissed as ‘mere puffery’ [were] legally actionable;
[and] (2) their complaint provided enough detail to support a strong inference
of scienter for each of the defendants . . . .”23 The Seventh Circuit afﬁrmed in
part and reversed in part.24 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court

15

Johnson v. Tellabs, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 941 (N.D. Ill. 2004).

16

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2505-06.
Their complaint stated, inter alia, that Tellabs and Notebaert had engaged in
securities fraud in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
SEC rule 10b-5, also that Notebaert was a ‘controlling person’ under § 20(a) of the
1934 Act, and therefore derivatively liable for the company’s fraudulent acts.

Id. (citations omitted). The complaint also “allege[d] that Brick engaged in illegal insider trading in
violation of § 20A of the Act.” Tellabs I, 437 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted).
17

Johnson, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 959.

18

Id.; Tellabs I, 437 F.3d at 593.

19

Tellabs I, 437 F.3d at 593 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12
(1976)).
20
Johnson, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 971; Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2506; Tellabs I, 437 F.3d at 594.
The district court found that Shareholders pled with particularity that Notebaert’s statements were
misleading but failed to show he acted with scienter. Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2506; see also Johnson
v. Tellabs, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 941 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
21

Johnson, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 956-57; Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2506; Tellabs I, 437 F.3d at

22

Johnson, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 961, 969; Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2506.

23

Tellabs I, 437 F.3d at 594.

24

Id. at 605.

594.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2008

3

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 8 [2008], No. 2, Art. 11

632

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 8

that the Shareholders had pled with particularity that Notebaert’s statements were
misleading.25 The Seventh Circuit, however, used its reasonable person test, and
overruled the district court ﬁnding the Shareholders adequately alleged a “strong
inference” of scienter with respect to Notebaert’s actions.26
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari “to resolve the
disagreement among the circuits on whether, and to what extent, a court must
consider competing inferences in determining whether a securities fraud complaint
gives rise to a ‘strong inference’ of scienter.”27 In an eight-to-one decision delivered
by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held “[a] complaint will survive . . . only if a
reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as
compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”28
Thus, the Court vacated the Seventh Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case
for further proceedings.29
This case note examines the evolution of the heightened pleading standard for
securities fraud actions and the disagreement among the circuits in interpreting
this standard.30 First, it traces the heightened pleading standard for securities
fraud up to Tellabs.31 Next, it argues the Court developed an improper rule.32
Additionally, it contends Justice Alito and Justice Scalia’s concurrences proposed
the proper standard for pleading requirements.33 Finally, this case note discusses
the impact the Tellabs decision will have on the Tenth Circuit in the future.34

BACKGROUND
Reacting to the market crash in 1929, Congress enacted two federal statutes
to regulate securities transactions.35 These securities laws sought to protect
investors and to maintain conﬁdence in the securities markets, which seemed
to have eroded after the market crash.36 Congress enacted the Securities Act of
25

Id. at 596-600.

26

Id. at 603-05. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s opinion. Id. at 605.
27

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2506.

28

Id. at 2510.

29

Id. at 2513.

30

See infra notes 51-87 and accompanying text.

31

See infra notes 51-87 and accompanying text.

32

See infra notes 197-235 and accompanying text.

33

See infra notes 197-235 and accompanying text.

34

See infra notes 236-250 and accompanying text.

35

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 727 (1975); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77l (2006); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006).
36

H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
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1933 (1933 Act) to protect investors against fraud, ensure disclosure of material
information concerning public offerings of securities, and to promote honesty
and fair dealing in the market.37 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934
Act) complemented the 1933 Act by protecting investors in two ways.38 First, it
protected investors from unfair practices by regulating securities exchanges and
over-the-counter markets operating in commerce.39 Second, it protected investors
by imposing standardized reporting requirements on publicly traded companies.40
As part of the 1934 Act, Congress created the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) and gave it the power to enforce the Acts.41 Section ten of the 1934 Act
(§ 10(b)) makes it
unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.42
In 1942, acting under the authority granted by § 10(b) of the 1934 Act,
the SEC promulgated rule 10b-5.43 Rule 10b-5 allows the SEC to regulate

37
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 1-5 (1933)); see also Blue
Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 728; 15 U.S.C. § 77l.
38

Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195; S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 1-5 (1934); Blue Chip Stamps, 421
U.S. at 728; 15 U.S.C. § 78b.
39

Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195 (stating the 1934 Act intended to protect investors from the
manipulation of stock prices in securities markets); S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 1-5 (stating the purpose
of the 1934 Act was to protect investors by the regulation of securities exchanges); Blue Chip Stamps,
421 U.S. at 728 (stating the 1934 Act intended to protect investors from inequitable and unfair
practices by the regulation of securities exchanges); 15 U.S.C. § 78b.
40
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195; S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 1-5; Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at
728; 15 U.S.C. § 78b.
41
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j (2006); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195; Blue
Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 728-29.
42

15 U.S.C. § 78j.

43

Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195; Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 729. Allowing standing for
securities fraud actions,
Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artiﬁce to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
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securities fraud.44 Although § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 allow the
SEC to regulate securities fraud, neither permits private actions for such fraud.45
Nevertheless, in 1946, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania held an implied private right of action existed under the statute.46
Twenty-ﬁve years later the Supreme Court ruled on this issue in Superintendent
of Insurance of the State of New York v. Bankers Life and Casualty Company.47 The
Supreme Court conﬁrmed the overwhelming opinions of the district courts and
the courts of appeals when it established a private right of action is available
under § 10(b).48 In 1976, the Supreme Court clariﬁed another rule when it held,
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, that to establish liability under § 10(b) and 10b-5
negligence was insufﬁcient, and the plaintiff must prove the defendant acted with
scienter.49 The circuits adopted the scienter standard; however, the adoption of
a private right of action created a split among the circuits regarding pleading
requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.50

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951).
44

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.

45

Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 196 (“[Section] 10(b) does not by its terms create an express civil
remedy for its violation . . . .”); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 729 (“Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
does not by its terms provide an express civil remedy for its violation.”).
46
Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The court based its
reasoning on the well-established notion that a violation of a statute constitutes a wrongful act and a
tort. Id. Thus, Congress would have made it clear in the statutory language if it intended to prevent
recovery from private parties injured by securities fraud. Id. Because Congress did not make it clear
in the statutory language, Congress must have intended to follow general tort law, thus allowing
civil actions under § 10(b). Id.
47

Superintendent of Ins. of State of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9

(1971).
48
Id. at 13 n.9. The Court stated, in its opinion, a private right of action is recognized under
Rule 10b-5 as a remedy for securities fraud actions. Id. at 13. Then, in footnote 9, the Court
acknowledged that a private right of action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act is “now established.”
Id. at 13 n.9. This decision remained consistent with the Supreme Court’s earlier recognition in
dictum of J. I. Case Company v. Borak that “[p]rivate enforcement of . . . [securities laws] provides a
necessary supplement to Commission [(SEC)] action.” J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432
(1964).
49
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193. The Court deﬁned scienter as “a mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Id. at 193 n.12. Every court of appeals has recognized
that the plaintiff may meet the scienter requirement by showing that defendant acted reckless,
however, the Supreme Court is yet to rule on this issue. Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2507 n.3; Ernst &
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
50
Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2507; Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12; Superintendent of Ins. of
State of N.Y., 404 U.S. at 13 n.9.
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Pleading Requirements Under The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure
All of the circuits have consistently recognized that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure “9(b) applies to actions brought under the federal securities laws.”51
Compared to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) is a heightened pleading standard, requiring the circumstances
constituting fraud be stated with particularity.52 However, it provides “[m]alice,
intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person, may be averred
generally.”53 Although the circuits agreed Rule 9(b) governs pleadings for securities
fraud actions, the courts divided on its interpretation.54 The Ninth Circuit
merely required plaintiffs to state scienter existed.55 The First Circuit’s pleading
requirement proved more stringent, requiring a plaintiff to state facts that give
rise to an inference of scienter.56 The Second Circuit had the strongest pleading

51

In re GlenFed, Inc. Securities Litigation, 42 F.3d 1541, 1545 (9th Cir. 1994); accord Shields
v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (2nd Cir 1994) (acknowledging Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b) applies to securities fraud); Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 25 (1st
Cir. 1992) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9b applies to actions brought under the federal
securities laws).
52

FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) states that “[i]n alleging fraud
or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.
Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Id.
Conversely, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) merely requires “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
53

FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).

54

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2507. The Second Circuit required the plaintiff to allege facts that
give rise to a “strong inference” that the defendant acted with “fraudulent intent.” E.g., Shields,
25 F.3d at 1128 (requiring plaintiffs to allege facts that give rise to a “strong inference” that the
defendant acted with “fraudulent intent”); Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 12-13 (2nd Cir. 1989)
(requiring a complaint to allege facts that give rise to a “strong inference” that the defendant
“possessed the requisite fraudulent intent”); Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2nd Cir.
1979) (holding plaintiffs must state facts that give rise to a “strong inference” that defendant acted
with fraudulent intent). The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation was at the opposite end of the spectrum
of the Second Circuit. Compare In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d at 1547 (“[P]laintiffs may
aver scienter generally, just as the rule states-that is, simply by saying that scienter existed.”), with
Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128-29. The First, Fifth and Seventh Circuits choose a middle ground. Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (No. 06-484), 2007 WL 460606. These circuits used different
language, but they all required the plaintiff to allege facts that supported a reasonable inference that
the defendant acted with the required state of mind. See Greenstone, 975 F.2d at 25; Brief for the
United States, supra note 54, at 14-15 (citing Tuchman v. DSC Comm’cns Corp., 14 F.3d 1061,
1068 (5th Cir. 1994); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990)).
55
In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d at 1546-47 (“We are not permitted to add new
requirements to Rule 9(b) simply because we like the effects of doing so. This is a job for Congress,
or for the various legislative, judicial, and advisory bodies involved in the process of amending the
Federal Rules.”).
56

Greenstone, 975 F.2d at 25 (holding the complaint must “set forth speciﬁc facts that make it
reasonable to believe that defendant knew that a statement was materially false or misleading.”).
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requirement, requiring plaintiffs to state, with particularity, facts that give rise to
a “strong inference” of scienter.57 The split between circuits triggered the need
for change and established the importance of uniform pleading requirements in
securities fraud actions.58 Thus, following the Ninth Circuit’s dicta that stated
Congress had the responsibility to develop a uniform standard for pleading
requirements in securities fraud actions, Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).59

Congress’s Enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
In addition to setting a uniform pleading standard among the circuits for
§ 10(b) actions, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in
an effort to reduce frivolous securities fraud litigation while allowing meritorious
claims to proceed.60 Congress acknowledged private securities actions provided
defrauded investors with a necessary relief for their losses.61 In addition, Congress
noted frivolous lawsuits have run rampant and the PSLRA seeks to maintain
conﬁdence in markets while protecting investors.62 Although the PSLRA provided

57

Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128; Ross, 607 F.2d at 558.

58

H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.); see also Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2504;
Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 344 (4th Cir. 2003); Nathenson v.
Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 407 (5th Cir. 2001); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271,
1282 (11th Cir. 1999).
59
In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d at 1546; Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006).
60
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (Conf. Rep.) (stating that “[t]his legislation implements
needed procedural protections to discourage frivolous litigation,” while noting the importance of
private securities litigation); Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2508; PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006).
61
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503, 1510 (2006); H.R.
REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (Conf. Rep.).
62
See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1510-11 (noting abuses like
nuisance ﬁlings had run rampant and the PSLRA emerged as an effort to curb these abuses); H.R.
REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (Conf. Rep.). Congress had heard signiﬁcant evidence of abusive practices
in four forms:

(1) the routine ﬁling of lawsuits against issuers of securities and others whenever there
is a signiﬁcant change in an issuer’s stock price, without regard to any underlying
culpability of the issuer, and with only faint hope that the discovery process might
lead eventually to some plausible cause of action; (2) the targeting of deep-pocket
defendants . . . without regard to their culpability; (3) the abuse of the discovery
process to impose costs so burdensome that it is often economical for the victimized
party to settle; and (4) the manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom
they purportedly represent.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (Conf. Rep.).
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both “substantive and procedural controls,” one of the most notable additions was
Congress’s attempt to standardize the PSLRA pleading requirements.63 Section 1
of the PSLRA states in relevant part that:
[i]n any private right of action . . . the complaint shall specify
each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or
reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation
regarding the statement or omission is made on information and
belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on
which that belief is formed.64
Section 2 of the PSLRA states in relevant part that “[i]n any private action
. . . the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate
this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind.”65
Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and § 78u-4(b)(1) of the PSLRA
both require pleading the circumstances constituting fraud with particularity, there
exists a notable difference between the pleading requirements of the two.66 Rule
9(b) has a weaker standard with regard to the pleading requirements pertaining to
the defendant’s state of mind, allowing it to be “averred generally.”67 Conversely,
§ 78u-4(b)(2) of the PSLRA has a stringent requirement, demanding the plaintiff
to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind.”68
Congress had great intentions in enacting the PSLRA.69 However, Congress’s
failure to codify the Second Circuit’s case law or “throw much light on what facts

63
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2); Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2508. In addition to pleading
requirements, “Congress prescribed new procedures for the appointment of lead plaintiffs and lead
counsel. This innovation aimed to increase the likelihood that institutional investors—parties more
likely to balance the interests of the class with the long-term interests of the company—would serve as
lead plaintiffs.” Id. Additionally, Congress provided “provisions limit[ing] recoverable damages and
attorney’s fees, provide[d] a ‘safe harbor’ for forward-looking statements, . . . mandate[d] imposition
of sanctions for frivolous litigation, and authorize[d] a stay of discovery pending resolution of any
motion to dismiss.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1511; see also 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4.
64

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1).

65

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).

66

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).

67

FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). “Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind
may be alleged generally.” Id.
68

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2).

69

H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
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will sufﬁce to create [a strong] inference” has left the circuits divided again, this
time in deﬁning the term “strong inference.”70
Three different approaches developed among the circuits in determining the
facts a plaintiff must plead to meet the required “strong inference” of scienter.71
The Second and Third Circuits reasoned Congress intended to adopt the
Second Circuit’s pleading standard.72 In the case of In re Advanta Corp. Securities
Litigation, the Third Circuit reasoned Congress’s use of the Second Circuit’s
language in enacting the PSLRA indicated that Congress intended to adopt the
Second Circuit’s pleading standard.73 Additionally, the court argued that adoption
of the Second Circuit’s restrictive pleading standard in most jurisdictions would
be consistent with Congress’s intentions in strengthening the pleading standards
and reducing frivolous litigation.74 Thus, under the Second Circuit’s standard,
a plaintiff would succeed if he or she stated a claim that “establish[ed] a motive
and an opportunity to commit fraud, or by setting forth facts that constitute[d]
circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior.”75
Turning to the other extreme, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit rejected the
Second Circuit’s standard and opted instead for an even stricter standard, requiring
“strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct.”76
The Ninth Circuit in In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, reasoned that
rejection of the Second Circuit’s standard was proper because Congress intended

70
See Tellabs I, 437 F.3d at 601 (stating “Congress did not . . . throw much light on what facts
will sufﬁce to create [a strong] inference”); Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2509.
71

Tellabs I, 437 F.3d at 601; In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, 183 F.3d 970,
974 (9th Cir. 1999).
72

See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309-10 (2nd Cir. 2000) (“The statute effectively
adopts the Second Circuit’s pleading standard for scienter wholesale, and thus plaintiffs may continue
to state a claim by pleading either motive and opportunity or strong circumstantial evidence of
recklessness or conscious misbehavior.”); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534-35
(3rd Cir. 1999) (holding plaintiffs may “plead scienter by alleging facts establishing a motive and an
opportunity to commit fraud”).
73

In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d at 533-34; accord Novak, 216 F.3d at 309-10
(Congress’s use of the Second Circuit’s language in the PSLRA indicates a standard equal to the
Second Circuit’s standard.).
74

In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d at 534; accord Novak, 216 F.3d at 309-10. The
Second Circuit had the most stringent pleading standard, and therefore, the adoption of the Second
Circuit’s standard would be consistent with Congress’s intentions in strengthening the pleading
standards. Novak, 216 F.3d at 309-10.
75
In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d at 534-35; see also Novak, 216 F.3d at 309-10
(stating a plaintiff may succeed by “pleading either motive and opportunity or strong circumstantial
evidence of reckless or conscious misbehavior”).
76
In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d at 974; see also Bryant, 187 F.3d at 128587 (rejecting the Second Circuit’s standard and instead requiring a strong showing of severe
recklessness).
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to elevate the pleading requirement above any standards in existence at the time
of the PSLRA’s enactment.77 Furthermore, the court stated its reasoning best
explains Congress’s adoption of the Second Circuit’s “strong inference standard”
for the PSLRA while expressly refusing to codify the Second Circuit’s case law
interpreting that standard.78
Finally, the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits interpreted
the PSLRA by creating a middle ground.79 These circuits adopted a case-by-case
approach, requiring courts to look at the totality of the facts to determine if the
allegations gave rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent.80 The cases that
follow the middle ground approach argued Congress did not intend to adopt
the Second Circuit’s pleading standard.81 In addition, these cases stated that the
Act’s language indicated, “Congress plainly contemplated that scienter could be
proven by inference, thus acknowledging the role of indirect and circumstantial
evidence.”82 Furthermore, the courts held the PSLRA’s language does not require
“nor prohibit the use of any particular method to establish an inference of

77

In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d at 974.

78

Id.

79

City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Companies, Inc., 264 F.3d 1245, 1261-62 (10th Cir

2001).
80
Id. at 1261; accord Ottmann, 353 F.3d at 345 (agreeing a case-by-case approach is appropriate);
Florida State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 659-60 (8th Cir. 2001)
(holding the Eighth Circuit will follow the middle ground approach); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251
F.3d 540, 550-52 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding the case-by-case approach best reﬂects Congress’s intent);
Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195-97 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding the First Circuit
analyzes the facts of each case to determine whether those facts alleged support a “strong inference”
of scienter); Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 410-12 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating it followed
the approach taken by the Sixth Circuit).
81

Greebel, 194 F.3d at 195-97; accord City of Philadelphia, 264 F.3d at 1261-62 (holding a factspeciﬁc approach best reﬂects Congress’s intent); Ottmann, 353 F.3d at 345 (holding the legislative
history regarding the adoption of the Second Circuit standard inconclusive); Florida State Bd. of
Admin., 270 F.3d at 659-60 (holding the PSLRA “adopted only the strong-inference-of-scienter
standard, without codifying the particular methods of satisfying the standard.”); Helwig, 251 F.3d at
550-52 (stating the PSLRA never refers to motive and opportunity); Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 410-12
(holding the legislative history on whether Congress intended to adopt the motive and opportunity
approach is ambiguous).
82
Greebel, 194 F.3d at 195; accord City of Philadelphia, 264 F.3d at 1261-62 (holding the
Act’s language indicates Congress’s belief that scienter could be proven by inference); Ottmann,
353 F.3d at 345 (holding the court must examine all of the allegations to determine if they give rise
to a “strong inference” of scienter); Florida State Bd. of Admin., 270 F.3d at 659-60 (holding the
primary effect of the PSLRA “is to require a pleading to state facts giving rise to a ‘strong inference
of scienter.’”); Helwig, 251 F.3d at 551 (quoting Greebel that “Congress plainly contemplated that
scienter could be proven by inference, thus acknowledging the role of indirect and circumstantial
evidence.”); Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 410 (quoting Greebel that “Congress plainly contemplated that
scienter could be proven by inference, thus acknowledging the role of indirect and circumstantial
evidence.”).
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scienter.”83 Finally, the courts argued Congress mandated inferences of scienter
only survive if both reasonable and “strong.”84 Considering the “strong” aspect
of the PSLRA, the First Circuit and the Sixth Circuit raised its middle ground
standard to a higher level.85 In In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., the First
Circuit held that when considering the complaint as a whole, a plaintiff has not
met the “strong inference” standard where “there are legitimate explanations for
the behavior that are equally convincing.”86 In Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., the Sixth
Circuit held “plaintiffs are entitled only to the most plausible of competing
inferences,” but the inference does not have to be “irrefutable.”87 The circuit splits
regarding the interpretation of the PSLRA’s “strong inference” standard led the
United States Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari in the Tellabs case.88

PRINCIPAL CASE
In Tellabs I, the Seventh Circuit adopted the middle ground standard,
requiring an examination of all the complaint’s allegations to decide whether they
gave rise to a “strong inference” of scienter.89 However, the Seventh Circuit failed
to adopt the Sixth Circuit’s standard for the survival of a complaint.90 According
to the Sixth Circuit’s standard, “plaintiffs are entitled only to the most plausible
of competing inferences,” but the inference does not have to be “irrefutable.”91
Worried the Sixth Circuit’s standard might infringe on the plaintiff ’s Seventh
Amendment rights to a jury trial, the Seventh Circuit adopted its own standard
for the survival of a complaint.92 Reversing the decision of the district court, the
83
Greebel, 194 F.3d at 195-96; accord Ottmann, 353 F.3d at 345 (holding the Act’s language
does not specify any particular method to establish an inference of scienter); Florida State Bd. of
Admin., 270 F.3d at 659-60 (holding Congress did not mandate a particular method of satisfying
the “strong inference” standard); Helwig, 251 F.3d at 551 (quoting Greebel that “‘the words of
the act neither mandate nor prohibit the use of any particular method to establish an inference
of scienter.’”); Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 411 (citing Greebel that the “PSLRA neither mandated nor
prohibited any particular method of establishing a strong inference of scienter.”).
84

Greebel, 194 F.3d at 195; accord Florida State Bd. of Admin., 270 F.3d at 660 (holding
inferences only survive if they are both strong and reasonable); Helwig, 251 F.3d at 553 (holding
inferences must be reasonable and strong).
85

See In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 49 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding plaintiff
fails to meet the “strong inference” standard where “there are legitimate explanations for the behavior
that are equally convincing.”; Helwig, 251 F.3d at 553 (holding “the ‘strong inference’ requirement
means plaintiffs are entitled only to the most plausible of competing inferences.”).
86
In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d at 49; see also Helwig, 251 F.3d at 553 (holding
“the ‘strong inference’ requirement means that plaintiffs are entitled only to the most plausible of
competing inferences.”).
87

Helwig, 251 F.3d at 553.

88

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2506 (2007).

89

Tellabs I, 437 F.3d 588, 601 (7th Cir. 2006).

90

Id. at 601-02.

91

Helwig, 251 F.3d at 553.

92

Tellabs I, 437 F.3d at 602.
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Seventh Circuit found the complaint survived because “it allege[d] facts from
which, if true, a reasonable person could infer that the defendant acted with the
required intent.”93 Consequently, Tellabs appealed the decision of the Seventh
Circuit and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari “to resolve the
disagreement among circuits on whether, and to what extent, a court must consider
competing inferences in determining whether a securities fraud complaint gives
rise to a ‘strong inference’ of scienter.”94
In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged it must develop a more workable PSLRA “strong inference” pleading
standard while still maintaining the PSLRA’s goals of reducing frivolous claims
but allowing meritorious ones to proceed.95 The Court held the determination
of whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss is not whether an individual
allegation, viewed in isolation, meets the “strong inference” standard.96 Rather,
courts must look at all of the facts alleged to determine if those facts give rise to a
“strong inference” of scienter.97
Because of the circuit split and Congress’s failure to provide an explanation
as to the facts needed to meet the “strong inference” standard, the Tellabs Court
settled the disagreement.98 The Court decided that in determining whether the
pled facts met the “strong inference” requirement, a court must look at reasonable
opposing inferences.99 The Court noted the Seventh Circuit failed to take this step
when it determined the Shareholders met the “strong inference” requirement.100
The Seventh Circuit mistakenly held a complaint could survive if it “allege[d] facts
from which, if true, a reasonable person could infer that the defendant acted with
the required intent . . . .”101 Conversely, when Congress enacted the PSLRA, one
of the Act’s main purposes involved heightening the pleading standards required
in a securities fraud action.102 Congress determined it insufﬁcient to allege facts
from which a reasonable person could ﬁnd an inference of scienter.103 Thus, the

93

Id.

94

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2506.

95

Id. at 2509.

96

Id. The Court ﬁrst reiterated that when dealing with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a §
10(b) action, a court must accept all the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Id.
97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2509.

100

Id.

101

Id. (quoting Tellabs I, 437 F.3d at 602).

102

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2508.

103

Id. at 2510. See also In re Cerner Corp. Sec. Litig., 425 F.3d 1079, 1084, 1085 (8th Cir.
2005) (holding inferences of scienter do not survive a motion to dismiss unless the inferences are
both reasonable and strong).
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Court stated, “Congress required plaintiffs to plead with particularity facts that
give rise to a ‘strong’ i.e., a powerful or cogent-inference.”104
In evaluating the strength of an inference, the Court stated, “it cannot be
decided in a vacuum.”105 Furthermore, the Court determined that in addition to
looking at inferences that favor the plaintiff, a court must also consider possible
explanations for the defendant’s conduct.106 However, the Court noted “[t]he
inference that the defendant acted with scienter need not be irrefutable, i.e., of
the ‘smoking-gun’ genre, or even the ‘most plausible of competing inferences.’”107
The Court determined this because the PSLRA pleading standards contained
only one constraint among many that heightened the requirements in instituting
a securities fraud action.108 Despite this reasoning, the Court again noted the
importance that “the inference of scienter must be more than merely ‘reasonable’
or ‘permissible’—it must be cogent and compelling, thus strong in light of other
explanations.”109 As a result, the Court held a plaintiff will succeed only if a
reasonable person would ﬁnd the inference of scienter “cogent and at least as
compelling” as any inference favoring the defendant.110
In other words, the Court held in addition to looking at inferences that
favor the plaintiff, a court must weigh the plaintiff ’s deductions against other
possible inferences favoring the defendant’s conduct.111 The Court acknowledged,
however, the inferences favoring the plaintiff do not need to be a dead give away,
nor do they even need to be the most realistic of the competing inferences.112 But,
the Court highlighted the importance the inference of scienter must be more
than “permissible,” it must be convincing to a reasonable person.113 Therefore, for
a complaint to survive, a reasonable person must ﬁnd the inference of scienter at
least as convincing as any inference favoring the defendant.114
Before concluding its discussion on scienter, the Court addressed two of
Tellabs’ contentions.115 First, Tellabs contended when considering competing

104

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2510.

105

Id.

106

Id.

107

Id. (quoting Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 2004)).

108

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2510.

109

Id.

110

Id.

111

Id.

112

Id. (“The inference that defendant acted with scienter need not be irrefutable, i.e., of the
‘smoking-gun’ genre, or even the ‘most plausible of competing inferences.’”).
113

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2510.

114

Id.

115

Id. at 2511.
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inferences, Notebaert’s lack of personal ﬁnancial gain proved dispositive.116 The
Court noted the defendant’s motive is an important consideration and proof of
defendant’s ﬁnancial gain might “weigh heavily in favor of a scienter inference.”117
However, in agreeing with the Seventh Circuit, the Court held the absence of
allegations proving a motive is not dispositive.118 The Court noted the presence
or absence of motive accounts for only one allegation, and it reiterated the
importance of taking all of the allegations, as a whole, to determine if the plaintiff
met the “strong inference” of scienter.119
Next, Tellabs argued four claims in the Shareholders’ complaint proved too
vague to give rise to a “strong inference” of scienter with respect to Notebaert’s
actions.120 First, regarding the false inﬂation of fourth-quarter results for 2000,
the Shareholders failed to allege whether Notebaert knew about the illegal channel
stufﬁng as opposed to the legal channel stufﬁng.121 Second, the Shareholders failed
to state particular dates proving Notebaert knew about the dropping demand
for the 5500 when he made multiple statements about the strong demand.122
Third, the Shareholders failed to prove the weekly or monthly reports, reviewed
by Notebaert, mentioned the TITAN 6500 was not ready for delivery.123 Thus,
the Shareholders failed to prove Notebaert knew the falsity of his statement that
the product was ready for delivery and demand was strong.124 Finally, because
the Shareholders failed to prove that Notebaert or the company beneﬁted from
the alleged fraud, both Tellabs and Notebaert lacked motive.125 The Court
agreed with Tellabs that vague and ambiguous statements would weigh against
the Shareholders in their attempt to meet the “strong inference” requirement.126
116

Id. See also Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 50. Tellabs stated that the complaint failed
to identify any motive on the part of Notebaert to commit fraud because he never sold any stock
during the class period which would have personally beneﬁted him. Id.
117

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2511.

118

Id.

119

Id.

120

Id. See also Brief for Petitioners at, supra note 1, at 43-50.

121

Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 43-50. Legal channel stufﬁng includes offering
customers discounts in an attempt to increase sales. Id. at 44. Writing purchase orders for products
customers never ordered, and then shipping the customers those products in an attempt to increase
sales fraudulently exempliﬁes illegal channel stufﬁng. Id.
122

Id. at 46-48.

123

Id. at 48-49.

124

Id.

125

Id. at 49-50.

126

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2511. Vague and ambiguous statements would count against
Shareholders in inferring scienter because 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) requires plaintiffs to “state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). Again, the court reiterated the importance of reviewing
all of the allegations collectively and not viewing each allegation individually. Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct.
at 2511.
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The Court, however, summarized by stating the reviewing court must weigh
all allegations and determine if a reasonable person would ﬁnd the inference of
scienter at least as strong as any opposing inference.127
Before concluding its opinion, the Court addressed the Seventh Circuit’s
constitutional argument.128 Justifying its ruling on the “strong inference” standard,
the Seventh Circuit stated that weighing opposing inferences and making a
decision is a role for the jury.129 It also noted that failing to allow jury review would
impinge upon the Shareholders’ Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury.130
The Court disagreed with the Seventh Circuit, stating it lies within Congress’s
power to determine what the plaintiff must plead to state a claim, and the Court
has never questioned that power.131 Furthermore, the Court has never held the
Seventh Amendment prohibits Congress from establishing heightened pleading
requirements for particular claims.132 The Court stated the Seventh Amendment
is not violated because the “heightened pleading rule simply ‘prescribes the means
of making an issue,’ and that, when ‘[t]he issue [was] made as prescribed, the right
of trial by jury accrues.’”133
The Court concluded by overruling the Seventh Circuit’s scienter test.134 The
Court did not determine, however, whether the Shareholders’ allegations met the
scienter requirement pursuant to the new rule handed down in its decision.135
Instead, the Court remanded the case back to the Seventh Circuit for further
proceedings consistent with the new rule.136

127

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2511. The Seventh Circuit held allegations of scienter must be
made with respect to each defendant individually. Tellabs I, 437 F.3d at 602-03. The Court did not
address whether allegations of scienter made against one defendant can be imputed to all the other
individual defendants. Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2511, n.6.
128
Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2511-12. The Supreme Court stated the Seventh Circuit unnecessarily
raised this issue on its own accord since Shareholders never raised it. Id. at 2512 n.7.
129

Id. at 2511-12.

130

Id.

131

Id. at 2512.

132

Id.

133

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2512 (quoting Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. United States,
187 U.S. 315, 320 (1902)). Fidelity & Deposit Co. dealt with a similar Seventh Amendment
contention regarding the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia’s rule established pursuant to
the rulemaking power Congress delegated that required defendants to state with particularity their
grounds for defense. Id. The Court entered judgment for the plaintiff because of the defendant’s
afﬁdavit lacked sufﬁciency. Id. The United States Supreme Court upheld the District of Columbia’s
holding that the rule did not violate the Seventh Amendment. Id. The Court stated the right to a
trial by jury would begin once the defendant properly stated his grounds for defense. Id.
134

Id. at 2512.

135

Id.

136

Id.
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Justice Scalia’s Concurrence
Unhappy with the new rule the Court developed, Justice Scalia concurred.137
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia disagreed with the Court’s opinion
that an inference “‘at least as compelling as any opposing inference,’” can be
considered a “strong inference.”138 Justice Scalia reasoned the Court must give
the phrase “strong inference” its normal meaning.139 The proper test, therefore,
“should be whether the inference of scienter (if any) is more plausible than the
inference of innocence.”140 He argued the Court’s rejection of his test fell on two
erroneous lines of reasoning.141 First, irrefutable facts are not required to prove a
“strong inference” of scienter.142 Justice Scalia began his analysis by noting that
Congress should determine the proper pleading standard, and Congress did so
by using the phrase “strong inference.”143 According to Justice Scalia, it is now
the Court’s job to give that phrase its normal meaning.144 Justice Scalia noted the
Court abandoned the statutory text in favor of judicial inference when the Court
enacted a test allowing a tie to go to the plaintiff.145 Justice Scalia concluded by
stating that enacting the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards Congress did
not intend to allow plaintiffs to win in a close case.146
Justice Scalia stated the second erroneous reason the Court rejected his test
lies in the contention that “the inference of scienter . . . [must be] at least as
compelling as any opposing inference.”147 The effect of this rule would allow a
tie to go to the plaintiff, an outcome contrary to the ordinary rule of tort law.148
Justice Scalia argued that if Congress meant to depart from the ordinary rule
in which a tie goes to the defendant, the statute would have indicated it.149 He
concluded by noting that the contrary proves true because Congress “explicitly
strengthen[ed] [the] rule by extending it to the pleading stage of a case.”150

137

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).

138

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2513 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at

2505).
139

Id. at 2513-14 (Scalia, J., concurring).

140

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated that his test and the Court’s test will seldom
produce different results because two opposing inferences rarely prove exactly equal. Id. at 2514.
141

Id. at 2513 (Scalia, J., concurring).

142

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).

143

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2513-14 (Scalia, J., concurring).

144

Id. at 2514 (Scalia, J., concurring).

145

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).

146

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).

147

Id. at 2510; Id. at 2513 (Scalia, J., concurring).

148

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2510; Id. at 2513 (Scalia, J., concurring).

149

Id. at 2514 (Scalia, J., concurring).

150

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Justice Alito’s Concurrence
Justice Alito agreed with Justice Scalia that the proper test for pleading
requirements would demand an inference slightly stronger than no inference of
scienter.151 Justice Alito stated Justice Scalia’s test for the pleading requirements
acts similar to the test used at the summary-judgment and judgment-as-a-matterof-law stages.152 Differing from the Court, Justice Alito believed Congress did not
intend to develop a new test.153 Rather, Justice Alito thought the test should run
consistent with the one used at the summary-judgment stage, one with which the
courts remain familiar.154
Additionally, Justice Alito disagreed with the Court’s decision that all of the
facts must be taken into consideration when determining whether the plaintiff met
the “strong inference” of scienter.155 Instead, Justice Alito concluded only those
facts pled with particularity should determine the sufﬁciency of the inference of
scienter.156 He stated that because the clear language requires the inference of
scienter to arise from facts stated with particularity, “[i]t follows that facts not
stated with the requisite particularity cannot be considered in determining whether
the strong-inference test is met.”157 Justice Alito criticized the Court for stating
non-particularized facts should determine whether the plaintiff met the scienter
requirement.158 In addition to contradicting the statute’s clear language, Justice
Alito stated the Court’s holding would allow plaintiffs to beneﬁt from alleging facts
that do not meet the particularity requirement.159 Finally, he criticized the Court
for its interpretation of the particularity requirement.160 Justice Alito reasoned the
Court stripped the word “of all meaning” because its particularity requirement
equaled a normal pleading review.161 Consistent with the Court’s interpretation,
under a normal pleading review the court gives more weight to particularly pled
facts than those pled ambiguously.162 Thus, there existed no distinction between
151

Id. at 2516 (Alito, J., concurring).

152

Id. (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito’s test examines the pleadings to determine whether
“no genuine issue” exists “as to any material fact” that the defendant possessed the required strong
inference of scienter. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2510 n.5.
153

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2516 (Alito, J., concurring).

154

Id. (Alito, J., concurring).

155

Id. at 2515-16.

156

Id. (Alito, J., concurring).

157

Id. at 2516 (Alito, J., concurring). Section 78u-4(b)(2) states that “the complaint shall
. . . state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
158

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2516 (Alito, J., concurring).

159

Id. (Alito, J., concurring).

160

Id. (Alito, J., concurring).

161

Id. (Alito, J., concurring).

162

Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
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the Court’s interpretation of the particularity requirement and a normal pleading
review.163
In conclusion, Justice Alito stated, “Questions certainly may arise as to
whether certain allegations meet the statutory particularity requirement, but
where that requirement is violated, the offending allegations cannot be taken into
account.”164 Thus, a court may only use those facts pled with particularity to meet
the “strong inference” standard.165

Justice Stevens’s Dissent
Justice Stevens began his dissent by stating that since Congress left the phrase
“strong inference” undeﬁned, it would follow implicitly that Congress gave the
judiciary lawmaking authority to determine its meaning.166 He acknowledged the
Court developed a workable deﬁnition of the phrase, however, his “probablecause” standard would prove less complicated in application and more consistent
with statutory interpretation.”167 Under Justice Stevens’s test, the facts must show
probable cause that the defendant acted with a “strong inference” of scienter.168
Justice Stevens admitted that his deﬁnition does not have an exact measurement,
but the concept is familiar to judges.169 Furthermore, the meaning is similar to
that of “strong inference.”170 He criticized Justice Scalia’s test by stating Congress
would not have intended the Court to adopt a standard that would make it more
difﬁcult to bring a civil case than a criminal one.171 Justice Stevens noted his
deﬁnition would beneﬁcially omit the weighing of opposing inferences when
easily deemed a strong inference.172 Justice Stevens gave this example to illustrate
his point:
[I]f a known drug dealer exits a building immediately after a
conﬁrmed drug transaction, carrying a suspicious package, a judge
could draw a strong inference that the individual was involved in
the aforementioned drug transaction without debating whether
the suspect might have been leaving the building at that exact
time for another unrelated reason.173
163

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2516 (Alito, J., concurring).

164

Id. (Alito, J., concurring).

165

Id. (Alito, J., concurring).

166

Id. at 2516-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

167

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2517 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

168

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

169

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

170

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

171

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

172

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2517 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

173

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens applied this example to the channel stufﬁng allegations in the
Tellabs case and decided taking the facts as true, they clearly established “probable
cause to believe” Notebaert acted with the necessary intent.174 Thus, he would
have afﬁrmed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit.175

ANALYSIS
In deciding Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., the United States
Supreme Court correctly overruled the Seventh Circuit’s test for a complaint’s
survival.176 In addition, the Court correctly determined the need for considering
plausible opposing inferences when determining if the plaintiff met the “strong
inference” of scienter.177 The Court erred, however, in the new test it developed
for determining whether the facts alleged have met the required “strong inference”
of scienter.178 The new test merely requires the plaintiff to allege facts that support
an inference of scienter “at least as likely as” any credible opposing inference in
favor of the defendant.179 The Court erred by allowing a tie in inferences to go to
the plaintiff, instead of adopting a test like the one proposed by Justice Scalia.180

174
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens found that taking the channel stufﬁng allegations
as true, they are proof that Notebaert had knowledge of illegal practices occurring. Id. at 2517 n.2.
For example, Notebaert worked directly with the sales personnel to channel stuff its customer, SBC.
Id. In addition, customers returned orders they did not want, and because of the high returns,
Tellabs had to rent storage space to accommodate all the returns. Id.
175

Id. at 2518 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

176

Supreme Court Clariﬁes Standards for Stock-Fraud Plaintiffs, 23 No. 2 ANCODLLR 3
(2007); David Stras, A Lingering Thought on Tellabs, http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/
archives/2007/06/a_lingering_tho.html (June 23, 2007, 10:08 EST) (David Stras, a former United
States Supreme Court clerk for The Honorable Clarence Thomas, currently works as a professor of
law at the University of Minnesota Law School).
177
See Supreme Court Clariﬁes Standards for Stock-Fraud Plaintiffs, supra note 176; A
Lingering Thought on Tellabs, supra note 176.
178

See infra notes 197-212, 217-235 and accompanying text.

179

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2513.

180

John C. Coffee, Jr., Federal Pleading Standards after ‘Tellabs,’ Bell Atlantic’, 7/19/2007
N.Y.L.J. 5, (col.1), 4 (2007); Posting of Joe Grundfest to WSJ Law Blog, Tellabs: Securities Lawyers
React, http://blogs.wsj.com/law (June 21, 2007, 13:03 EST). Joe Grundfest posted the blog on
The Wall Street Journal Online. Joe Grundfest, a Securities Law Professor at Stanford Law School
and a former SEC Commissioner acknowledged that the decision constituted a clear victory for
the defendants but proved not as “thorough a thrashing of the plaintiffs as some plaintiff lawyers
had feared.” See Grundfest, supra note 180. Professor Grundfest acknowledged the downfall of the
opinion, leaving room for lower courts to determine that the inference of scienter, is equally in favor
of plaintiff, allowing a tie to go to the plaintiff. Id. Professor Grundfest acknowledged this approach
would ignore the Court’s holding that the inference of scienter “must be cogent and compelling,
thus strong in light of other explanations.” Id. He concluded the Court’s decision would lead to a
new split of the lower courts over the proper interpretation of Tellabs’ pleading standard. Id. Justice
Scalia’s test is “whether the inference of scienter (if any) proves more plausible than the inference of
innocence.” Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2513 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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The second error pertains to the facts used to determine if the plaintiff met the
“strong inference” of scienter.181

Where the Court Correctly Ruled
Although uncertain whether the Supreme Court’s test will provide a workable
outcome to the “strong inference” standard, the Court correctly held the Seventh
Circuit’s rule did not meet the heightened pleading standards Congress intended
when it enacted the PSLRA.182 The Seventh Circuit’s test “contradicts both the
language and the purpose of the PSLRA.”183 The Seventh Circuit required the
complaint allege facts that “a reasonable person could infer that the defendant
acted with the required intent.”184 The statute’s plain language, however, requires
a “strong inference,” not a “reasonable” or “permissible” inference as required
by the Seventh Circuit.185 The Seventh Circuit’s test reﬂects the approach taken
prior to the PSLRA where any reasonable inference of fraud would support a
claim.186 This standard previously proved unworkable, and resulted in Congress

181

See A Lingering Thought on Tellabs, supra note 176.

182

In re Silicon Graphics Inc, Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d at 978-79 (explaining Congress intended
to adopt a standard higher than the Second Circuit’s, the highest standard at the time of enacting
the PSLRA). This means the Seventh Circuit’s standard which is lower than the Second Circuit’s
does not meet the heightened pleading standards intended by Congress. See also Tellabs II, 127 S.
Ct. at 2504 (acknowledging that the Seventh Circuit’s standard does not meet the stricter intent of
Congress in enacting the PSLRA); supra notes 89-104 and accompanying text.
183
See Coffee, supra note 180, at 4; In re Silicon Graphics Inc, Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d at 978-79;
Brief for New England Legal Found. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Pet’rs at 11, Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (No. 06-484), 2007 WL 445337; see also
In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 49 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Scienter allegations do
not pass the ‘strong inference’ test when . . . there are legitimate explanations for the behavior
that are equally convincing.”); Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 896-97 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding a consideration of inferences only favorable to the plaintiff would undermine the PSLRA’s
strong inference requirement); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 553 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding
“plaintiffs are entitled only to the most plausible of competing inferences”).
184

Tellabs I, 437 F.3d 588, 602 (7th Cir. 2006).

185

Helwig, 251 F.3d at 551, 553 (“[T]he ‘strong inference’ requirement means that plaintiffs
are entitled only to the most plausible of competing inferences. This represents a signiﬁcant
strengthening of the pre-PSLRA standard under Rule 12(b)(6), which gave the plaintiff ‘the beneﬁt
of all reasonable inferences . . . .’”); In re Cabletron Systems, Inc. 311 F.3d 11, 38 (1st Cir. 2002)
(“Under the PSLRA, the complaint must state with particularity facts that give rise to a ‘strong
inference’ of scienter, rather than merely a reasonable inference.”); Brief for the United States, supra
note 54, at 20-21; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006); see In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d
at 48 (holding “[t]hat the statute, by its terms, requires a ‘strong,’ rather than merely a ‘reasonable,’
inference that the defendant acted with scienter is more than an odd linguistic quirk.”).
186

Brief of Technet, The Info. Tech. Ass’n of Am., The Semiconductor Indus. Ass’n, Aea,
Baybio, The Cal. Healthcare Inst. and The Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support
of Pet’r at 12, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (No. 06-484),
2007 WL 445338; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 104-98,
at 15 (1995).
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enacting the PSLRA.187 Furthermore, a “reasonable” inference is inconsistent with
Congress’s intent in requiring heightened pleading standards under the PSLRA
because a reasonable inference is less than a “strong inference.”188 Therefore, the
Court correctly rejected the Seventh Circuit’s test.189
Additionally, the Court correctly determined “[t]he strength of an inference
cannot be decided in a vacuum” and requires a consideration of “plausible
nonculpable explanations for the defendant’s conduct, as well as inferences
favoring the plaintiff.”190 The Court’s decision follows many of the circuits on this
issue requiring an inquiry into possible opposing inferences of the defendant’s
conduct.191 Moreover, the Court’s ruling remains consistent with the PSLRA’s
plain language, which requires a “strong inference” of scienter.192 “Strong” means
“striking or superior of its kind . . . .”193 Thus, a “strong inference” reigns “superior”
to other possible inferences.194 Since a “strong inference” holds superior to other
inferences, determining whether an inference proves “strong” would require a

187

H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 15.

188

Brief of Technet, supra note 186, at 15; H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (Conf. Rep.) (stating
the PSLRA has implemented needed procedural protections to reduce frivolous litigation); In
re Silicon Graphics Inc, Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d at 979. The In re Silicon court noted that Congress
adopted the Second Circuit’s language of strong inference because it held a higher standard than
the reasonable standard of other circuits. Id. However, Congress did not adopt the Second Circuit’s
two-prong test because it did not meet the heightened pleading standards the PSLRA intended. Id.
Thus, a reasonable inference proves less convincing than a “strong inference,” and therefore, not
in-line with Congress’s intent in enacting the PSLRA. See Id.
189

See Supreme Court Clariﬁes Standards for Stock-Fraud Plaintiffs, supra note 176; see also In
re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d at 48 (holding “that the statute, by its terms, requires a
‘strong,’ rather than merely a ‘reasonable,’ inference that the defendant acted with scienter is more
than an odd linguistic quirk.”); Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2504 (acknowledging that the Seventh
Circuit’s standard does not meet the stricter intent of Congress in enacting the PSLRA).
190
Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2510; accord Helwig, 251 F.3d at 553; Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339
F.3d 1182, 1187-88 (10th Cir. 2003).
191
See, e.g., In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d at 51 (holding the court should not
“turn a blind eye” to other possible conclusion arising from the facts alleged); Pirraglia, 339 F.3d at
1187 (holding a court must consider all reasonable inferences, even those inferences which are not
favorable to the plaintiff ); Gompper, 298 F.3d at 896-97 (holding a consideration of inferences only
favorable to the plaintiff would undermine the PSLRA’s strong inference requirement); Helwig, 251
F.3d at 553 (holding “plaintiffs are entitled only to the most plausible of competing inferences”).
192

Brief for New England Legal Found., supra note 183, at 12; 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(2)

(2006).
193

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2265 (Una Dlx ed 1986).

194

Brief for New England Legal Found., supra note 183, at 12; see Helwig, 251 F.3d at 553
(“‘Strong inferences’ nonetheless involve deductive reasoning; their strength depends on how
closely a conclusion of misconduct follows from a plaintiff ’s proposition of fact. [T]he ‘strong
inference’ requirement means that plaintiffs are entitled only to the most plausible of competing
inferences.”).
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comparison of other possible opposing inferences.195 Therefore, the Court correctly held the determination of whether an inference is strong requires a
comparison of the plaintiff ’s inferences with competing inferences relating to the
defendant’s conduct.196

Justice Scalia’s Test, the Proper Interpretation
Although the Court’s test reﬂects the heightened pleading standard Congress
intended in enacting the PSLRA, Justice Scalia’s test remains the most “workable
construction of the ‘strong inference’ standard.”197 Justice Scalia’s test properly
follows the statute’s “natural reading” and provides more guidance.198
The Court’s test requires the “inference of scienter must be more than merely
plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any
opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”199 This rule proves ﬂawed because it
“leaves room for lower courts to reason ‘gee, the story in support of scienter seems
as cogent as the story in opposition to scienter, and that’s good enough.’”200 This
195
Brief for New England Legal Found., supra note 183, at 12; see also Helwig, 251 F.3d at 553
(“‘Strong inferences’ nonetheless involve deductive reasoning; their strength depends on how closely
a conclusion of misconduct follows from a plaintiff ’s proposition of fact. [T]he ‘strong inference’
requirement means that plaintiffs are entitled only to the most plausible of competing inferences.”);
Gompper, 298 F.3d at 896-97 (holding a consideration of inferences only favorable to the plaintiff
would undermine the PSLRA’s strong inference requirement).
196
See Helwig, 251 F.3d at 553; Gompper, 298 F.3d at 896-97 (holding that consideration of an
“equally if not more plausible” inference of the defendant’s innocence “clearly impedes the plaintiffs’
progress toward building the requisite strong inference of scienter.”); Brief for New England Legal
Found., supra note 183, at 12 (stating a strong inference is superior to other inferences); Tellabs II,
127 S. Ct. at 2509-10 (holding the determination of whether plaintiff meets the strong inference
standard requires consideration of opposing inferences).
197
See Darquea v. Jarden Corp., 2007 WL 2584744, 1-2, 2 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating that
the court agrees with the “persuasive” reasoning of Justice Scalia).
198
See Darquea, 2007 WL 2584744, 1-2, 2 n.2 (noting the persuasiveness of Justice Scalia’s
reasoning because it follows the natural statutory language); Communications Workers of Am. Plan
for Employees’ Pensions and Death Beneﬁts v. CSK Auto Corp., 525 F. Supp 2d 1116, 1120 n.2
(D. Ariz. 2007) (stating an inference cannot be strong if it is equal to an innocent explanation, it
is the same).
199

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2504-05.

200

Grundfest, supra note 180 (quoting Tellabs II, 127 S.Ct. at 2502); see also Transit Rail, LLC
v. Marsala, 2007 WL 2089273, 13 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (reasoning that a reasonable person could just
as easily infer facts in favor of the defendant as the plaintiff ); Sherrie R. Savett, Plaintiffs’ Vision of
Securities Litigation: Trends/Strategies in 2005-2007, 1620 PLI/Corp 57, 97 (2007) (“[C]ourts will
no doubt continue to grapple with major issues relating to the ‘strong inference’ language, including
the manner in which allegations sufﬁcient to give rise to a ‘strong inference’ of scienter may be
pleaded.”); Thomas O. Gorman, Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: Pleading a Strong
Inference of Scienter, 1620 PLI/Corp 151, 184 (“The standard gives the District Court signiﬁcant
discretion in construing the allegations contained in a plaintiff ’s securities law complaint.”); F.
Hodge O’Neal & Robert B. Thompson, Resisting Squeeze-outs and Oppression:Remedies Under
Federal Law, OPPMINSH S 8:14 (stating the Court’s test “leaves open multiple outcomes”).
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reasoning would allow a tie to go to the plaintiff, ultimately ignoring the Court’s
warning that “‘the inference of scienter must be more than merely ‘reasonable’
or ‘permissible’ it must be cogent and compelling, thus strong in light of other
explanations.’”201 Therefore, it seems likely this rule will lead to another split
between the circuits on the interpretation of Tellabs’s pleading standard.202
Conversely, Justice Scalia’s test requires the inference of scienter to be slightly
stronger than the inference of no scienter.203 A test that demands an inference
slightly stronger than any opposing inference would eliminate the possibility of
a tie between inferences.204 This would resolve potential splits in the circuits on
their interpretation of the inferences.205 The way the rule currently stands, some
courts might interpret the inferences in favor of plaintiffs while other courts
would interpret those same inferences in favor of defendants.206
Not only does Justice Scalia’s test resolve potential disputes between the
circuits, it also is consistent with a natural reading of the statute.207 “Courts . . .
must give the statute its single, most plausible, reading.”208 In analyzing Justice

201

See Grundfest, supra note 180; Coffee, supra note 180, at 4; Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2510.

202

Compare Ross v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1117 (S.D. OH. 2007)
(ruling in favor of the plaintiff because “the plaintiff ’s allegations are at least as compelling” as
defendant’s), with Frank v. Dana Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 922, 927-28, 930, 932-33 (N.D. OH.
2007) (ruling in favor of defendant because plaintiff ’s inferences were not “more plausible and
powerful” than competing inferences or the “most plausible” of competing inferences); see Savett,
supra note 200, at 97 (stating courts continue to struggle with what allegations give rise to a “strong
inference”); Gorman, supra note 200, at 184 (stating the Court’s test gives the lower courts great
discretion); O’Neal & Thompson, supra note 200 (stating the Court’s test “leaves open multiple
outcomes”); Grundfest, supra note 180.
203

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2516 (Alito, J., concurring).

204

Id. at 2513-14 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Coffee, supra note 180, at 4.

205

See Coffee, supra note 180, at 4; see Darquea, 2007 WL 2584744, 1-2, 2 n.2 (stating this is
a case where Justice Scalia’s test would make a difference in the outcome of the case).
206
See Coffee, supra note 180, at 4; Savett, supra note 200, at 97 (“[C]ourts will no doubt
continue to grapple with major issues relating to the ‘strong inference’ language, including the
manner in which allegations sufﬁcient to give rise to a ‘strong inference’ of scienter may be
pleaded.”); Gorman, supra note 200, at 184 (“The standard gives the District Court signiﬁcant
discretion in construing the allegations contained in a plaintiff ’s securities law complaint.”); O’Neal
& Thompson, supra note 200 (stating the Court’s test “leaves open multiple outcomes”).
207
Beneﬁts v. CSK Auto Corp., 525 F. Supp 2d 1116, 1120 n.2 (D. Ariz. 2007) (explaining an
inference cannot be strong unless it is greater than a competing inference).
208
Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2515 (Scalia, J., concurring); see, e.g., State of N.J. v. State of N.Y.
1997 WL 291594, 23 (U.S. 1997) (“The most important and well-established [rule of statutory
construction] is that, if possible, the Court will undertake a plain-language reading of the terms
of [the statute].”); U.S. v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 74 (1994) (stating an elementary canon of
construction requires the plain statutory language to control); Mukaddam v. Permanent Mission
of Saudi Arabia to United Nations, 111 F. Supp. 2d 457, 467 n.65 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[T]he
Court follows basic principles of statutory construction and looks ﬁrst to the plain language of the
statute.”).
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Scalia’s test, § 21D(b) of the PSLRA requires the plaintiff to plead facts which give
rise to a “strong inference.”209 The Supreme Court deﬁnes “strong” as “cogent,”
“persuasive,” and “powerful.”210 Accordingly, a strong inference outweighs, by
power or persuasion, an opposing inference.211 Thus, the normal reading of the
statute would demand a test like Justice Scalia’s which requires that the inference
of scienter prove slightly stronger than the inference of no scienter.212
Additionally, Justice Scalia’s test equates with many circuits that hold a “strong
inference” of scienter is not met if a competing inference is just as plausible.213 In
209

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2) (2006); see also Darquea, 2007 WL 2584744, 1-2, 2 n.2
(noting the persuasiveness of Justice Scalia’s test because the language of the statute requires a “strong
inference,” thus the test should require a more plausible inference than one of innocence).
210

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2510.

211

CSK Auto Corp., 525 F. Supp 2d at 1120 n.2 (explaining an inference cannot be considered
strong unless proven greater than an opposing inference); Brief for New England Legal Found.,
supra note 183, at 12; see also Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2513 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating a
possibility “that B is responsible is not a strong inference that B is responsible”); Helwig, 251 F.3d
at 553 (holding plaintiff ’s inferences must be compared to opposing inferences and plaintiff is
entitled only to the strongest of opposing inferences); In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d
at 49 (“[S]cienter allegations do not pass the ‘strong inference’ test when . . . there are legitimate
explanations for the behavior that are equally convincing.”); Gompper, 298 F.3d at 896-97 (holding
that consideration of an “equally if not more plausible” inference of the defendant’s innocence
“clearly impedes the plaintiffs’ progress toward building the requisite strong inference of scienter.”);
Ottman, 353 F.3d at 350 (holding a plaintiff has failed to meet the “strong inference” standard
where a misstatement “was just as likely the result of an overgeneralization as it was the product of
intentional deception or recklessness.”).
212

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2516 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2513
n.* (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating a possibility “that B is responsible is not a strong inference
that B is responsible”); Helwig, 251 F.3d at 553 (holding “plaintiffs are entitled only to the most
plausible of competing inferences. This represents a signiﬁcant strengthening of the pre-PSLRA
standard under Rule 12(b)(6), which gave the plaintiff ‘the beneﬁt of all reasonable inferences
. . . .’”); In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d at 49 (holding an inference is not strong if
there are equally legitimate explanations); Gompper, 298 F.3d at 896-97 (holding consideration of
an equal inference of the defendant’s innocence impedes plaintiff ’s meeting the “strong inference”
requirement); Ottman, 353 F.3d 350 (holding a plaintiff has failed to meet the “strong inference”
standard where a misstatement “was just as likely the result of an overgeneralization as it was the
product of intentional deception or recklessness.”); Brief for New England Legal Found., supra note
183, at 12 (stating a “strong inference” is superior to other inferences). Additionally, Justice Stevens
criticized Justice Scalia’s test by stating that Congress would not have intended the Court to adopt a
standard that would make it more difﬁcult to bring a civil case than a criminal one. Tellabs II, 127
S. Ct. at 2517 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213
See, e.g., In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d at 49 (holding “scienter allegations
do not pass the ‘strong inference’ test when . . . there are legitimate explanations for the behavior
that are equally convincing.”); Gompper, 298 F.3d at 896-97 (holding that consideration of an
“equally if not more plausible” inference of the defendant’s innocence “clearly impedes the plaintiffs’
progress toward building the requisite strong inference of scienter.”); Ottman, 353 F.3d 350 (holding
a plaintiff has failed to meet the “strong inference” standard where a misstatement “was just as likely
the result of an overgeneralization as it was the product of intentional deception or recklessness.”);
Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding the “strong inference” requirement only
entitles the plaintiff to the “most plausible of competing inferences”); CSK Auto Corp., 525 F. Supp
2d at 1120 n.2 (explaining an inference equal to an opposing inference is not strong, it is equal).
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the case of In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., the court noted the PSLRA meant
to establish a strict standard for pleading in a securities fraud action to meet the
“strong inference” requirement.214 Following the strict standard of the PSLRA,
the First Circuit in In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. held when considering the
complaint as a whole, a “strong inference” is not met where “there are legitimate
explanations for the behavior that are equally convincing.”215 The Court’s opinion
should have followed the lead of these circuits that gave the statute its normal
reading, and therefore, used Justice Scalia’s test.216

Justice Alito’s Particularity Requirement, the Correct One
In addition to making an erroneous ruling by not following Justice Scalia’s
test, the Court erred again when it failed to utilize Justice Alito’s particularity
requirement.217 Justice Alito’s requirement only allowed consideration of those
facts stated “with particularity” in determining if the “strong inference” standard
was met.218 Unfortunately, the Court developed a ﬂawed rule by failing to recognize
the PSLRA’s “particularity” requirement.219 First, although the Court reiterated
that the PSLRA requires facts to be pled with “particularity,” the Court’s opinion
weakened this standard.220 This was evidenced when the Court stated, “omissions
and ambiguities [only] count against inferring scienter,” but stressed “that a court
should consider all allegations of scienter, even nonparticularized ones, when
considering whether a complaint meets the ‘strong inference’ requirement.”221
214

In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d at 48.

215

Id. at 49.

216

See Darquea, 2007 WL 2584744, 1-2, 2 n.2 (agreeing with the reasoning of Justice Scalia
and Justice Alito).
217
See In re K-tel Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d 881, 889 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting that
ambiguous facts which do not live up to the particularity requirement are discarded); In re Trex Co.,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 454 F. Supp. 2d 560, 572 (W.D. Va. 2006) (stating plaintiffs may not beneﬁt from
facts not pled with the requisite particularity).
218

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2515-16 (Alito, J., concurring).

219

Gompper, 298 F.3d at 896-97 (Congress made it clear that the PSLRA requires facts pled
with particularity to give rise to a “strong inference” of scienter); In re K-tel Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 300
F.3d at 889 (stating the PSLRA requires the court to disregard those facts which are not pled with
particularity); Brief of Technet, supra note 186, at 12; Brief for the United States, supra note 54, at
21; see A Lingering Thought on Tellabs, supra note 176 (stating the language of the statute implies
that only facts pled with particularity can be used to meet the strong inference standard).
220
See In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d at 49 (holding the PSLRA requires that
the plaintiff plead facts with particularity); Gompper, 298 F.3d at 897 (holding only complaints with
particularized facts that meet the strong inference standard survive a motion to dismiss); Helwig, 251
F.3d at 548 (holding under the PSLRA the plaintiff must plead facts with particularity); Ottman,
353 F.3d 350 (holding the PSLRA requires the plaintiff to plead the facts in the complaint with
particularity).
221
Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2515-16 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2511
(The Court allowed consideration of ambiguous facts in the determination of a “strong inference”
of scienter when the Court “agree[d] that omissions and ambiguities count against inferring scienter
. . . .”).
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Congress used the “particularity” requirement to prevent plaintiffs from defeating
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim by merely pleading vague or
ambiguous facts.222 Considering non-particularized facts in determining whether
plaintiff met the “strong inference” standard undermines Congress’s purpose,
thus allowing the plaintiff to evade the “particularity” requirement altogether.223
Conversely, Justice Alito’s standard enforces Congress’s purpose and upholds the
particularity requirement by allowing only those facts pled with particularity in
determining whether the plaintiff met the “strong inference” requirement.224
Additionally, the Court’s interpretation is ﬂawed because it contradicts the
plain statutory language.225 Before Congress enacted the PSLRA, Rule 9(b)
governed the pleading requirements for fraud demanding that facts be pled with

222

See Gompper, 298 F.3d at 897 (“Congress made it crystal clear that the [PSLRA’s] pleading
requirements were put in place so that only complaints with particularized facts giving rise to a
strong inference of wrongdoing survive a motion to dismiss . . . .”); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.,
187 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999) (Congress “structur[ed] the [PSLRA] to permit the dismissal
of frivolous cases at the earliest feasible stage of litigation . . . .”); H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31
(1995) (Conf. Rep.) (stating Congress has enacted needed procedural protections to reduce the
amount of frivolous lawsuits); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 15 (1995) (stating Congress developed the
PSLRA to enact stringent pleading requirements to deter frivolous suits); Brief of Technet, supra
note 186, at 12; Brief for the United States, supra note 54, at 21-22; A Lingering Thought on
Tellabs, supra note 176.
223

See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (Conf. Rep.) (Congress recognized a need to strengthen
pleading standards to reduce frivolous litigation); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 15 (Congress enacted the
PSLRA to establish a stringent pleading requirement); Winer Family Trust v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319,
327 (3rd Cir. 2007) (stating “Congress did not merely require plaintiffs to ‘provide a factual basis
for [their] scienter allegations’. . . . Congress required plaintiffs to plead with particularity facts that
give rise to a ‘strong—i.e., a powerful or cogent-inference.”); Gompper, 298 F.3d at 897 (stating
the PSLRA only allows complaints pled with particular facts that give rise to a “strong inference”
of scienter to survive a motion to dismiss); In re K-tel Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d at 889 (stating
the PSLRA requires the court to disregard those facts not pled with particularity); Bryant, 187
F.3d at 1278 (stating the PSLRA is meant to dismiss those complaints at the earliest possible stage
which have not pled particular facts that rise to a “strong inference” of scienter); Brief of Technet,
supra note 186, at 12; Brief for the United States, supra note 54, at 21-22; A Lingering Thought on
Tellabs, supra note 176.
224
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (Conf. Rep.) (stating the PSLRA has strengthened
pleading requirements to reduce frivolous litigation); Gompper, 298 F.3d at 896-97 (stating the
PSLRA requires facts pled with particularity to give rise to a “strong inference” of scienter); In re
Trex Co., Inc. Sec. Litig., 454 F. Supp. 2d at 572 (stating plaintiffs may not beneﬁt from vague or
ambiguous facts); In re Rockefeller Ctr. Properties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 224 (3d Cir.
2002) (stating according to the PSLRA plaintiffs may not beneﬁt from vague or ambiguous facts).
225
See also Gompper, 298 F.3d at 896-97 (Congress made it clear the PSLRA requires facts
pled with particularity to give rise to a “strong inference” of scienter); In re K-tel Int’l, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 300 F.3d at 889 (stating the PSLRA requires the court to disregard those facts not pled with
particularity); Brief of Technet, supra note 186, at 12; Brief for the United States, supra note 54, at
21; A Lingering Thought on Tellabs, supra note 176.
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“particularity.”226 Congress enacted the PSLRA in an attempt to curb frivolous
litigation by making the pleading standards higher.227 With this purpose in mind,
Congress kept the “particularity” requirement of Rule 9 in the PSLRA.228 Section
78u-4(b)(2) of the PSLRA states “the complaint shall, with respect to each act
or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”229
According to the statutory language, the plaintiff may only meet the “strong
inference” standard by those facts stated in the complaint with particularity.230
Therefore, “[i]t follows that facts not stated with the requisite particularity
cannot be considered in determining whether the strong-inference test is met.”231
However, the Court allowed the use of nonparticularized facts when it held that
a court must consider all of the facts in determining whether a complaint meets

226
In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d at 1545; accord Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d
22, 25 (1st Cir. 1992) (according to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 9(b) the facts constituting
fraud must be pled with particularity); Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1127-28
(2nd Cir 1994) (holding when fraud is asserted the complaint must meet the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)); FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
227

H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (Conf. Rep.).

228

H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (Conf. Rep.).

229

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).

230

See A Lingering Thought on Tellabs, supra note 176 (stating the language of the statute
implies that only facts pled with particularity can be used to meet the strong inference standard);
Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2516 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Winer Family Trust, 503 F.3d at 327
(stating “Congress did not merely require plaintiffs to ‘provide a factual basis for [their] scienter
allegations’. . . . Congress required plaintiffs to plead with particularity facts that give rise to a
‘strong’—i.e., a powerful or cogent-inference.”); Key Equity Investors, Inc. v. SEL-LEB Mktg.,
Inc., 246 Fed. Appx. 780, 785 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding plaintiff may not beneﬁt from vague or
ambiguous facts that do not live up to the PSLRA’s particularity requirement); Gompper, 298 F.3d
at 896-97 (stating the PSLRA clearly states that only those facts pled with particularity must give
rise to a “strong inference” of scienter); In re K-tel Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d at 889 (stating the
PSLRA only allows those facts pled with particularity to be used in determining if the plaintiff met
the “strong inference” standard); In re Rockefeller Ctr. Properties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d at 224
(stating according to the PSLRA the “strong inference” standard must be met by those facts pled
with particularity); Brief of Technet, supra note 186, at 12; Brief for the United States, supra note
54, at 21.
231
Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2516 (Alito, J., concurring); see Key Equity Investors, Inc., 246 Fed.
Appx. at 785 (holding plaintiff may not beneﬁt from vague or ambiguous facts that do not live up to
the PSLRA’s particularity requirement); California Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394
F.3d 126, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding plaintiff may only beneﬁt from particular facts and cannot
beneﬁt from vague facts in meeting the PSLRA’s “strong inference” standard); Gompper, 298 F.3d at
896-97 (stating the PSLRA requires facts pled with particularity to give rise to a “strong inference”
of scienter, thus facts not pled with the requisite particularity will not sufﬁce) In re Navarre Corp.
Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 741 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding the court must disregard ambiguous facts
that do not live up to the PSLRA’s “particularity” requirement); Brief of Technet, supra note 186,
at 12; Brief for the United States, supra note 54, at 21-22; A Lingering Thought on Tellabs, supra
note 176.
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the “strong inference” standard.232 Thus, the Court’s interpretation did not follow
the statute’s plain language because it did not limit the consideration of facts to
only those facts pled with particularity.233 Conversely, Justice Alito’s interpretation
correctly followed the plain language of the statute by only allowing those facts pled
“with particularity” to be viewed in determining whether the “strong inference”
had been met.234 Therefore, Justice Alito’s interpretation proved proper.235

The Tellabs Impact on the Tenth Circuit
The Tellabs decision received mixed reactions; some articles announced a win
for corporate America, while others proclaimed no clear win for either side.236
Although the overall impact may not materialize for some time, the potential
inﬂuence of Tellabs on the Tenth Circuit deserves discussion.

232
Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2516 (Alito, J., concurring); Id. at 2511. After the Court noted that
ambiguities count against inferring scienter, the Court “reiterate[d], however, that the court’s job is
not to scrutinize each allegation in isolation but to assess all the allegations holistically.” Id. at 2511;
see A Lingering Thought on Tellabs, supra note 176 (stating the Court ignored the particularity
requirement); Gregg L. Weiner, Esq., Supreme Court Raises The Bar For Securities Fraud Plaintiffs,
But Questions Remain, 18 No. 1 ANMALAR 12, 4 (2007) (stating the Court allows the use of
ambiguous facts in determining if plaintiff met the strong inference requirement).
233

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2516 (Alito, J., concurring); see A Lingering Thought on Tellabs,
supra note 176, (stating the statutory language implies that only facts pled with particularity can
be used to meet the strong inference standard, which the Court failed to follow); see also Key Equity
Investors, Inc., 246 Fed. Appx. at 785 (holding plaintiff may not beneﬁt from vague or ambiguous
facts that do not live up to the PSLRA’s particularity requirement); Gompper, 298 F.3d at 896-97
(stating the PSLRA clearly requires that facts must be pled with particularity to give rise to a “strong
inference” of scienter); In re K-tel Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d at 889 (stating the PSLRA only
allows facts pled with particularity to determine if the plaintiff met the “strong inference” standard);
In re Rockefeller Ctr. Properties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d at 224 (stating that according to the PSLRA
the plaintiff must meet the “strong inference” standard by those facts pled with particularity).
234

Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2516 (Alito, J., concurring); see supra note 233 and accompanying
text; California Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 394 F.3d at 145 (holding plaintiff may only beneﬁt from
particular facts and cannot beneﬁt from vague facts in meeting the PSLRA’s “strong inference”
standard); Florida State Bd. of Admin., 270 F.3d at 660 (holding the court must disregard ambiguous
facts that do not live up to the PSLRA’s “particularity” requirement).
235

See A Lingering Thought on Tellabs, supra note 176 (stating Justice Alito’s particularity
argument follows the plain language of the statute which implies that only facts pled with
particularity can be used to meet the strong inference standard); see also Key Equity Investors, Inc.,
246 Fed. Appx. at 785 (holding plaintiff may not beneﬁt from vague or ambiguous facts that do
not live up to the PSLRA’s particularity requirement); California Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 394 F.3d
at 145 (holding plaintiff may only beneﬁt from particular facts and cannot beneﬁt from vague facts
in meeting the PSLRA’s “strong inference” standard); Gompper, 298 F.3d at 896-97(Congress was
clear the language of the PSLRA requires facts to be pled with particularity); Florida State Bd. of
Admin., 270 F.3d at 660 (holding the court must disregard ambiguous facts that do not live up to
the PSLRA’s “particularity” requirement).
236

See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 232, at 4; Tellabs: Securities Lawyers React, http://blogs.
wsj.com/law (June 21, 2007, 13:03 EST); Tony Mauro, High Court Raises the Bar for Investors
Alleging Securities Fraud (June 22, 2007), http://biz.yahoo.com/law; Greg Stohr, Top U.S. Court
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City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Companies, Inc., was the ﬁrst securities fraud
case the Tenth Circuit ruled on after the passage of the PSLRA.237 The court
began by rejecting the arguments upheld by the Second and Third Circuits; these
arguments held “pleading motive and opportunity, without more, provides an
alternative method to establish scienter.”238 Instead, the Tenth Circuit followed
the middle ground approach of the First and Sixth Circuits that required the
court to “look to the totality of the pleadings to determine whether the plaintiffs’
allegations permit a strong inference of fraudulent intent.”239 The court also noted
plaintiffs could plead scienter by “setting forth facts raising a ‘strong inference’ of
intentional or reckless misconduct.”240
Pleading scienter in securities fraud continued to evolve in the Tenth Circuit.241 Following the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., the
Tenth Circuit took a notable step in considering whether the plaintiffs met the
scienter requirement.242 The court held that in determining whether plaintiffs
established scienter, it “‘must consider all reasonable inferences to be drawn from
the allegations, including inferences unfavorable to the plaintiffs.’”243 However,
the court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s standard that “‘plaintiffs are entitled only
to the most plausible of competing inferences.’”244 The court reasoned the Sixth
Circuit’s standard would “invade the traditional role of the fact ﬁnder.”245
Major adjustments by the Tenth Circuit prove unnecessary to align with the
pleading standards set forth in the Tellabs decision.246 The Tenth Circuit currently
looks at inferences unfavorable to the plaintiff to determine whether he or she met
the scienter standard, but it does not weigh competing inferences.247 Following
the Tellabs decision, the Tenth Circuit must “consider all competing inferences

Tightens Limits on Shareholder Suits (June 21, 2007), http://bloomberg.com; Supreme Court Issues
Tellabs Opinion, http://dandodiary.blogspot.com/2007/06/supreme-court-issues-tellabs-opinion.
html (June 22, 2007, 8:17 EST).
237

City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Companies, Inc., 264 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir 2001).

238

Id.

239

Id. at 1261-62.

240

Id. at 1259.

241

See Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding the court must
consider all reasonable inferences, including inferences favoring the defendant).
242

Id.

243

Id. (quoting Gommper, 298 F.3d at 897).

244

Pirraglia, 339 F.3d at 1188 (quoting Helwig, 251 F.3d at 553).

245

Pirraglia, 339 F.3d at 1188.

246

More Tellabs Thoughts: Does it Change D & O Exposure?, http://dandodiary.blogspot.com
(July 2, 2007 10:23 EST) (the author, Kevin LaCroix, has nearly 25 years of experience counseling
clients concerning director and ofﬁcer liability issues).
247

Pirraglia, 339 F.3d at 1187-88.
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of scienter which can be drawn from the complaint’s factual allegations, and
determine whether the inference suggested by the plaintiff is cogent and ‘at least
as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.’”248 Formerly,
the Tenth Circuit felt this step would “invade the traditional role of the fact
ﬁnder.”249 The Tenth Circuit’s rule permitting the pleading of scienter through
recklessness, however, will remain unchanged unless and until the Supreme Court
takes a stance.250

CONCLUSION
When the United States Supreme Court developed a new test for determining
whether the facts alleged have met the “strong inference” of scienter, the Court
failed to follow the statute’s plain language, thus frustrating Congress’s intentions
in enacting the statute.251 The Court should have followed the strict test developed
by many circuits and argued for by Justice Scalia in his dissent.252 This test required
the inference of scienter to be slightly stronger than the inference of no scienter.253
Adopting Justice Scalia’s test compared to the Court’s test would eliminate a
tie going to the plaintiff, thereby eliminating the potential for a future split in
circuits on the application of the Court’s test.254 Furthermore, the Court’s failure
in only considering those facts pled with particularity, as argued for by Justice
Alito, directly contradicts the statute’s natural language.255 This failure reduced
the heightened pleading standard Congress intended in enacting the PSLRA by
allowing plaintiffs to beneﬁt from facts not pled with particularity.256 Although
the outcome of this test is currently unknown, time will likely prove that the
Court’s failures lead to another split among circuits.257

248
Britton v. Parker, 2007 WL 2871003, *4 (D. Colo. 2007) (quoting Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct.
2499, 2504-05 (2007)).
249

Pirraglia, 339 F.3d at 1188.

250

City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Companies, Inc., 264 F.3d 1245, 1259 (10th Cir 2001);
Tellabs II, 127 S. Ct. at 2507 n.3; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976); see
supra note 49.
251

See supra notes 199-212, 217-223 and accompanying text.

252

See supra notes 203-216 and accompanying text.

253

See supra notes 203-212 and accompanying text.

254

See supra notes 203-206 and accompanying text.

255

See supra notes 225-234 and accompanying text.

256

See supra notes 219-223 and accompanying text.

257

See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
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